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Abstract
With a view to the results discussed in the first two parts of this paper, the con-
cept of time is revisited oncemore and chosen as an example in order to demon-
strate the meaning of „fundamental“ in both physical and philosophical terms. It
is shown that if arguments are given in favour of or against the concept of time,
then their ontological state has to be clarified in the first place.
Introduction
In the two preceding parts of this paper, aspects of modern metaphysics with a
view to consequences of recent results in loop quantum gravity have been
discussed in some detail, under both a foundational [1] as well as holistic [2]
perspective. It has been found that on a truly fundamental level, the world turns
out to be beyond traditional framework categories such as space and time. The
important point is however, to actually identify that fundamental level, in the
first place. The terminology of philosophy and physics is different here so that it
is necessary to give a sound definition of the „foundations“ of the world. Accor-
ding to a tradition which refers back to philosophers such as Spinoza, Leibniz,
and others, we have noticed that (re-phrasing Schelling in fact) foundation is
against that to which it is foundation, non-being. Hence, it is to the physical
world we (empirically) observe what possibility is to actuality. Space and time
therefore (as well as matter), are concepts which have no ontological meaning
beyond the physical world. With respect to the truly fundamental level (non-
being), they are emergent properties of the world to which this level is funda-
mental. As to time in particular, the foundation of the world is „eternal“ in the
strict sense, not referring to an infinite time length, but to a complete absence of
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time instead. Nevertheless, the conception of visualizing time (if not also space)
as something which is available on the fundamental level of the world is still
under dispute. So recently, Smolin has discussed what he calls challenges to the
arguments aiming at the elimination of time. [3]
As a postscript to the first two parts of this paper, we will discuss here a) the
question as to from what position the arguments in favour of the elimination of
time actually do argue, and b) what it is therefore, that Smolin defines as chal-
lenges of that argumentation. We start first of all with recalling some of Bar-
bour’s arguments as he has explained them in his book. [4]
1 Barbour’s Conception Revisited
Barbour visualizes the physical (quantum) world as a static world onto which
time is being projected by human observers. In a sense, there is a collection of
possible states of the world, and the human brain composes a movie of a se-
quence of states selected from this collection. Hence, the points of a world of
such Nows are worlds unto themselves: „No thread of time joins them up.“ ([4],
p.45) A given situation as it is being signified by some observer as having de-
veloped historically, can be thought of as a time capsule, i.e. a single configura-
tion of the Universe „that seems to be the outcome of a dynamical process of
evolution through time in accordance with definite laws.“ ([5], p.408) Hence,
the meaning of law here refers to rules which tell us how to transform configu-
rations from being possible to becoming actual (to establish, as Barbour says,
which configurations go from the „heap“ of possibilities into that of actualities).
([5], p.409) Alternatively, the respective probability distribution for one or the
other transition of this kind can be visualized as distribution of a kind of „mist“
such that the appearance of time arises from the fact that the mist is concentrated
on time capsules. Hence, the likeliness to experience a Now that is a time cap-
sule is greater than to experience one which is not. ([4], p.52) In fact, this can be
equivalently discussed in terms of the celebrated Wheeler-DeWitt equation of
the form HΨ = 0, where H is an appropriate Hamiltonian operator, and Ψ is the
„wave function of the Universe“.
I have criticized this approach earlier in the following sense: The idea that time
emerges out of timelessness, is not new as far as philosophy is being concerned.
Hence, Barbour’s sample world, called „Platonia“, should be named „Spinoza-
nia“ instead. (This is so because substance encodes structures in its potentiality,
but not concepts humans develop with respect to these structures.) Time shows
up as a convention, i.e. as part of human communicative strategies, rather than
as something which is a generic property of the Universe. It is only property of
the human world (of the physical Universe that is), in so far as there is a con-
vention which turns out to be practical for human life, if conceptualized accor-
ding to what humans perceive of their world. The actual choice is twofold then:
Either we agree that humans perceive their world in some incomplete manner.
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Then they model their world according to this incomplete perception. Or we
agree that their mode of perception defines their worldliness. Then they model
their world completely. But there may be many worlds. In the one case, humans
perceive the one (unique) real world under their generic (modal) perspective.
Hence, there may be many such perspectives. In the other case, humans perceive
their own (modal) world as it is. But the real world is a collection of the many
worlds. Recalling Spinoza’s conception of the one substance and its infinitely
many attributes, we realize that these two cases are essentially equivalent as far
as epistemology is concerned, but different from the ontological point of view.
There is no crucial experiment one could give in favour of the one or the other.
But the speculative consequences are manifold.
The point is that we have to carefully separate the physics from the philosophy.
Barbour formulates: „If we could see the universe as it is, we should see that it
is static. Nothing moves, nothing changes.“ ([4], p.39, emphasis mine) In strict
terms, this is not quite correct: The expression „static“ implicitly refers to a con-
vention of physics, namely to call something static for which the time variable is
absent in the relevant functions. But substance is not static, because it is not a
reduction of some function to another one for which the „parameter“ t can be set
to zero or does not show up at all. This is so because „t“ was never present, in
the first place. Hence, the term „static“ refers to physics, not to philosophy. On
the other hand, the formulation of „the universe as it is“ refers to the case of the
real Universe. But this is not empirically attainable for humans who can visuali-
ze the Universe in modal terms only. Hence, „it is“ is a formulation which refers
to philosophy, not to physics. Consequently, to be precise, the formulation
should rather be of the form: „If we could perceive (or measure) the universe as
it is realiter [but what we cannot actually do], we should notice that there is no
time.“ [Only modaliter therefore, do we have the impression of a world which
appears as if there were time. And we speak and behave accordingly.]
Note by the way though that even within the world, time perception is far from
being settled. Instead it is highly contextual. The more so, as we know by now
that even in everyday terms, we cannot be sure about our temporal perception.
As Eagleman and Sejnowski have shown recently [6], human temporal percepti-
on refers to a generic „time window“ of about 80 msec which is utilized by the
brain in order to co-ordinate sensory input data belonging to one and the same
event, but arriving in a sequential manner at the cerebral stimulus centre due to
their different channels (and speeds) of propagation. Basically, for being able to
synchronize all of them thus producing one perceived event, the brain has to
actually backdate the result. In other words: Even with respect to common eve-
ryday perceptions (pain e.g.) do we live „in our past“. This is already very much
on the line of what Barbour calls the „movie“ our brain composes of all the in-
coming sensory perceptions, and to a lapse function which is being created by
this procedure of composition. The consequences of this for the human means of
constructing their (everyday) world has been discussed in more detail in [7].
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Hence, coming back to the fundamental concept of time, the dynamics described
by Barbour is essentially one of 3-dimensional Riemannian spaces sequentiali-
zed in terms of an ordering principle. This idea going back to John Wheeler in
the sixties is discussed in Julian Barbour’s book, where he points out that the
„key geometric property of space-times that satisfy Einstein’s equations reflects
an underlying principle of best matching built into the foundations of the theo-
ry.“ ([4], p.176) The time separation of spatial slices shows up here as what
Barbour calls a distinguished simplifier, as an ordering principle for making un-
foldings simple. ([4], p.180) If time is being visualized as a mere ordering prin-
ciple, then, in philosophical terms, we are left with space as an attribute. Note
however, that the dimensionality of space is only a finite representation then,
which does not reflect the true nature of space, but only our modal attitude to-
wards it with a view to spatial ordering. This has been shown earlier [8] with
respect to the approach of topological quantum field theory which points to a
direct correspondence between the change of spin numbers in spin networks (on
the „microscopic level“ of description) and the change of space topology (on the
„macroscopic level“ of description). Note again that „time“ showed up here not
as a function, but as a manifold. And this is particularly interesting, because with
a view to what Barbour tells us about the „absence“ of time, this means that the
concept of time is intrinsically included here as a pragmatic ordering principle
for localizing topology changes. This is similar to what Prigogine calls the „age
of a system“, which is roughly a frequency of formations of new structures in a
system making the latter more complex. Time as a convention then, would be an
approximate „average“ over such ages. Hence, time shows up as being associa-
ted to a kind of measuring device for local complexity gradients. So what we
have in the end, is a rough (and simplified) outline of the foundations of emer-
gence, in the sense that we can localize the fine structure of emergence (the re-
arrangements of spin numbers in purely combinatorial terms being visualized in
philosophical terms as a motion-in-itself) and its results on the „macroscopic“
scale (as a change of topology being visualized by physical observers as a moti-
on-for-itself). This is actually what we would expect of a proper theory of emer-
gence. But note also that space and time, in the classical sense, are obviously
absent on a fundamental level of the theory, although they can be recovered as
concepts when tracing the way „upward“ to macroscopic structures. In other
words: even as a gross average feature for „shortsighted“ human scientists (as
Penrose indicates it at the end of his first twistor paper), space and time would
nevertheless turn up as (philosophical) categories of concepts, simply, because
the meaning of these categories is well-adapted to what humans actually percei-
ve of their world (and communicate to other humans). This is in fact, a point,
where Barbour’s argument seems to break down (if discussed within this philo-
sophical perspective): What he essentially shows in his book is that quantum
theory, in so far as it is foundational, describes partly what was called non-being
(or substance) in former times. Hence, there is neither space nor time in real
terms ( = realiter, i.e. with respect to what there is in an absolute sense of the
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world’s foundation), but there is space and time in modal terms ( = modaliter,
i.e. with respect to what humans perceive of their world). The former refers to
substance, or, alternatively, to what speculative philosophy is all about. The lat-
ter refers to the physical world, or, to what sceptical philosophy is all about. The
one relies on theoretical speculation according to what we know - speculating
about the foundation of the world, which is outside (logically „before“) the
world, and of which we are not a part therefore, and hence, about which we can-
not actually know anything. The other refers to the empirical world, about
which, with the help of experiments, we can obtain knowledge, in fact. Ob-
viously, in terms of physics, the first (speculative) aspect is corresponding to
physical theory, in so far as it is foundational. The second (sceptical) aspect cor-
responds to physical theory, in so far as it is empirical.
2 Smolin’s Arguments
So what we realize is that communicational difficulties between physics and
philosophy arise when the demarcation of their respective fields of activity re-
mains unclear. To make this more precise has been one task of this present pa-
per. The difficulty of interdisciplinary co-operation is that each participant is
asked to give up his/her own prejudices, in the first place, because „interdisci-
plinary“ does not refer to either discipline, but to something which is „between“
the disciplines, and which is something entirely new, therefore. (Similar to the
connotation of „intercultural“ which does not refer to any of the various cultu-
res, but to this innovative „in between“.)
Hence, checked against this attitude, we can easily realize that the arguments
which are listed by Smolin [3] in order to challenge Barbour’s conception centre
around physical epistemology, but do not conceptualize the notion of time with
a view to precise differentiation of „world“ and „foundation“. So his starting
point is already one which neglects the aforementioned demarcation. He states
„that every observable in a theory of cosmology should be measurable by some
observer inside the universe“ and that „all mathematical constructions necessary
should be realizable in a finite time.“ This is certainly a useful assumption, if the
reasonable modelling of physical phenomena is concerned, but it does not carry
any additional philosophical connotation so that the further statement: „However
my view is that this question [of the absence of time] is not one that can be sett-
led by philosophical argument alone.“ is not mediated with the epistemological
starting point. (Besides the fact that there is probably no reasonable philosopher
who would seriously undertake „to settle this question“ by himself.)
In fact, the question is not (and we have discussed this by now in some detail)
whether measurements within the physical world are limited somehow in terms
of information to be gained (or not). Or whether, in principle, time could be eli-
minated from theories about that world. The fact is: there is time (at least in epi-
stemological terms of a utilized concept) down to the basic quantum level of
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theories. The real question is instead: Is there time at all in the real world (of
which we can only observe a tiny part in principle)?
Smolin also emphasizes the role played by the requirement „that a theory of
cosmology must be falsifiable in the usual way ... This leads to the requirement
that a sufficient number of observables can be determined by information that
reaches a real observer inside the universe to determine either the classical hi-
story or quantum state of the universe.“ (emphasis mine) Hence: „If we want to
do cosmology, we must restrict ourselves to theories in which all observables
are accessible to real observers inside the universe.“ Again, the oberserver who
is a part of the Universe, cannot be a real observer, but rather a modal one. In
fact, there are no observers except modal ones. (They are not inside the Universe
though, because their perception actually defines the structures which constitute
the Universe. Instead, they are an intrinsic part of the Universe.)
Similar conceptual problems we can find in other passages: Smolin quotes e.g.
Markopoulou who argues in favour of an „interconnected web of Hilbert spaces
tied to the causal structure such that each act of observation [considered as an
event] is represented in terms of a Hilbert space constructed to represent the in-
formation available.“ Obviously, this is a formal problem of physical epistemo-
logy, but does not tell anything about the foundational aspects. (Because there
modally is a causal structure so long as we have space and time (quanta), i.e.
down to the spin network level. But what about the foundation of spin net-
works?)
The same problem occurs with the information transport within the world: „It is
only by insisting that the context of real observers inside their universe is de-
fined by the information that reaches them by means of radiation that propagated
from their past that a link is made between the issue of observability of the uni-
verse and its causal structure.“ True for physics. But obviously, if on the truly
fundamental level, there is no time (and space), the propagation of radiation is
ill-defined. Hence, the „projective mechanism“ (of what we might call the
functor Past) has its starting point in the classical world (on the level of humans
that is). Back projection comes first, propagation of information from the past
comes second. (Note that this does not mean that humans would arbitrarily con-
struct phenomena which they define afterwards. Contrary to that sort of solip-
sism, we assume that there is something real (independent of human perception),
but how it really „looks“ cannot be perceived.)
The point is that human observers conceptualize the world as if it would be con-
stituted of phenomena whose information is propagated through space and time.
So if for Smolin, it appears as being „hard to divorce the notion of causal struc-
ture from a finite speed for the propagation of information and hence time.“ he
is quite correct. But this does not tell us anything about the real world, it simply
characterizes the perception of the modal world.
So what we realize is that it is essentially the unclear demarcation of epistemo-
logical and ontological problems (i.e. of physical and philosophical questions)
that creates misunderstandings in the discussion of basic framework categories
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such as space, time (and matter). This is demonstrated again when Smolin co-
mes to his conclusions: „If the universe is discrete and time is real, and is itself
composed of discrete steps, then time may be none other than the process which
constructs, not only the universe, but the space of possible universes relevant for
observations made by local observers. / Beyond this, there is the possibility of a
quantum cosmology in which the actual history of the universe up till some
moment and the space of possible universes present at this ‚instant‘ are not two
different things, but are just different ways of seeing the same structure whose
construction is the real story of the world.“
It is difficult to see how time (whether it is visualized in real or modal terms)
can be a process. (This appears to be a problem of lexicology rather than of phy-
sics or philosophy.) And as it is a local concept utilized by observers, how can it
construct the Universe altogether? And what about „the space of possible uni-
verses“? The foundation of the world (possibility as opposed to actuality) has
not been defined in the paper at all (as far as I can see). So what concept of pos-
sibility is here utilized all of a sudden? Finally: How can „the actual history of
the universe“ (as re-constructed by the modelling of some observer) and „the
space of possible universes“ be one and the same thing of which different as-
pects can be observed (by whom)?
3 Conclusion
Hence, our main result here is the following: Barbour, in so far as he addresses
the physical problem of time, discusses the problem of whether quantum theory
could be formulated without a time variable. But as far as he discusses (as is his
declared intention) the question whether there is time in principle (in real terms,
not in modal terms), he addresses a philosophical problem. As to the first, he
raises interesting questions. As to the second, he does not tell us anything new.
(Hence, the title of his book is somewhat exaggerating.) Smolin however, in so
far he addresses the physical problem of time, can list a number of challenges to
the problem of whether quantum theory could be formulated without a time va-
riable. But as far as he discusses the question whether there is time in principle,
addressing therefore a philosophical question, he does not give any philosophi-
cal argument. Hence, as to the first, he also raises interesting questions. But as to
the second, he does not only tell us nothing new, but nothing at all, so that his
conclusions are more than unclear.
Apparently, the problem is that many physicists have realized by now that their
theories need philosophical conceptualization. This is actually an old idea dating
back to a famous talk given by René Thom some time ago. [9] And in the me-
antime, there is a number of philosophers around who have also some knowled-
ge of physics. And in fact, there have been occasions by now to enhance the
communication among the disciplines. One example can be found in [10]. But
innovative results from such interactions can only be expected, if the various
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oppositions which have emerged during the long history of separation which has
characterized the relationship between physics and philosophy (as well as the
relationship of schools within physics and philosophy, respectively) for the last
two hundred years can be successfully dissolved. Hence, communication should
replace confrontation.
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